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MYTHS OF (UN)CERTAINTY AT THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Ted Sichelman*
This Article disputes three "myths" regarding certainty and uniformity
in patent law. First, it rebuts the claim that the Federal Circuit has
mostly eliminated nonuniformity in the application of patent law.
Although the Federal Circuit has generally purged the longstanding
doctrinal splits among the regional circuit courts, because most patent
actions are not appealed, it is the district courts-which exhibit wide
variancefrom one another-thatare the effective courts of last resort.
As such, nonuniformity-and attendant forum shopping-remain
widespread. Second, this Article casts substantial doubt on the
assertion that the Federal Circuit's high claim construction reversal
rates are merely the result of litigants selecting the most uncertain
cases for appeal. Rather, in comparison to reversal rates for other
patent law issues, as well as rates for other types of complex cases in
the regional circuits, the best-supported inference is that claim
construction at the FederalCircuit is in need ofjurisprudentialrepair.
Third, collecting datafrom several sources, this Article contends that
the Federal Circuit's reversal rates on the whole are not particularly
high, and roughly the same as reversal rates in other circuits,
especially those for complex civil cases. Thus, claim construction
notwithstanding, for most patent law issues, appeals at the Federal
Circuit do not appear to be overly unpredictableor panel-dependent.

Assistant Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School;
M.S., Florida State University; A.B., Stanford University. I thank T.J. Chiang, Dennis Crouch,
Richard Gruner, Jay Kesan, Jeffrey Lefstin, Mark Lemley, Kelly Casey Mullally, Lee
Petherbridge, David L. Schwartz, and participants at The Federal Circuit as an Institution
Symposium at the Loyola Law School Los Angeles for their valuable suggestions and comments.
This version of the Article has been revised on pages 1177-78 to correct errors in the original
printing.
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INTRODUCTION

A general patent counsel at a Fortune 500 company recently
remarked, "[T]he Federal Circuit does a coin flip and reverses
district court decisions left and right. You might as well just roll the
dice."' When I was in legal practice, many patent litigators echoed
this sentiment. In this Article, I refine and test these sorts of claims,
incorporating and commenting upon the reflections of Professors
Richard Gruner,2 Kelly Casey Mullally,3 and David Schwartz' on
these issues, which appear earlier in this issue. In sum, I find that
these "myths," like that of the Fortune 500 patent counsel, are
generally overstated, but that the Federal Circuit has made a rather
poor showing in the claim construction area and has yet to fully
remedy judicial nonuniformity in patent litigation.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the genesis of the Federal
Circuit to more precisely define the types of uncertainty present in
the patent system. Part II debunks the myth that the Federal Circuit
has mostly eliminated nonuniformity across the various district
courts. Part III questions the assertion that the high rates of reversal
of the Federal Circuit on claim construction issues are not
problematic. Part IV nonetheless argues that appealing to the Federal
Circuit is not simply a "roll of the dice," and that in many doctrinal
areas, the court has a relatively low and stable reversal rate. In so
doing, I contend that claim construction is a somewhat unique case,
because it is an area in which the Federal Circuit has failed to
adequately address competing policy concerns. Part V concludes by
outlining research needed to measure fully and accurately the
uncertainty present in the patent system, so as to lay the groundwork
for appropriate reform.
1. Patent Troubles: Does the Patent System Need Fixing?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 2005,

at 61 (statements of Richard J. Rodrick, General Patent Counsel, S.C. Johnson & Son Inc.); see
also Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the FederalCircuit Crapshoot: EmphasizingPlain
Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1, 2 (2002) ("Such a disparity in panel

approaches [to claim construction] truly gives litigants no more certainty than a roll of the dice.").
2. Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of
Claim ConstructionReversal Rates at the FederalCircuit,43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 981 (2010).
3. Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un) Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY.

L.A. L. REv. 1109 (2010). As this Article is in part a reply to Mullally's article, I adopt the clever
and apt mongrel term of her title, "(Un)Certainty."
4. David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1073 (2010).
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I. THE BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE
VARIETIES OF UNCERTAINTY

The Federal Circuit has remarked on its founding and mission:
The purpose of this Court's enabling act, the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 ... is to provide a forum that will
increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law.

...

[To

that end the] Hruska Commission singled out patent law as
an area in which the application of the law to the facts of a
case often produces different outcomes in different
courtrooms in substantially similar cases. Furthermore ...
the patent bar indicated that uncertainty created by the lack
of national law precedent was a significant problem. . . .
The testimony received by the committee also supported the
basic objective of providing for uniformity of doctrinal
development in the patent area. . . . The creation of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce
desirable uniformity in this area of the law.'
This quotation from the legislative history of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act focuses on what I term "horizontal uniformity"namely, that if a case is brought in one district court, the outcome
would be the same if the case were brought in any other district
court.6 Yet, there is also a "vertical uniformity" at play in the courts.
Specifically, vertical uniformity is present when the outcome of the
trial court (or the Patent Office or International Trade Commission)
is appealed, and the appellate courts (here, a circuit court and the
Supreme Court) affirm the trial court decision on the same grounds.'
Vertical uniformity, therefore, concerns predictability as a case is

5. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

(quoting S. Rep. 97-975, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally
Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 259-61 (2003) (recounting the history of the creation of the

Federal Circuit).
6. For important perspectives on uniformity (and the lack thereof) at the Federal Circuit,
see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1989); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's

Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007); and Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner,
The Court of Appeals for the FederalCircuit's Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.

85 (2006).
7. Id
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appealed and-as Kelly Mullally insightfilly recognizes-may often
be in tension with the goal of horizontal uniformity.8
With these preliminary concepts in mind, I turn to analyze three
persistent myths regarding uniformity at the Federal Circuit.
II. MYTH #1: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS MOSTLY
ELIMINATED HORIZONTAL NONUNIFORMITY

There appears to be a widespread belief among commentators
that because the creation of the Federal Circuit eliminated the
plethora of appellate forums and often-conflicting precedents for
patent infringement actions, patent law is now horizontally uniform.
In other words, the result of any given case should now be the same
in any jurisdiction. Although the Federal Circuit has clearly reduced
horizontal nonuniformity, there are several reasons why it has not
been fully eradicated.
First, as Gruner aptly recognizes, most patent cases settle well
before any judgment, much less an appeal to the Federal Circuit. 0
However, I disagree with Gruner that the major driver of settlement
is agreement among the parties on the likely outcome of the case."
Rather, my experience-confirmed by the seasoned litigator Joseph
Re in his remarks at the symposium associated with this issue 2 is
that the high cost of litigation relative to the maximum amount at
stake is the major driver of most settlements.13 In this regard, at the
8. See Mullally, supra note 3, at 1126-30.
9. See, e.g., Nard & Duffy, supranote 6, at 1620; Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 74.
10. See Gruner,supra note 2, at 1031-32 (citing Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How
Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of
Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 237 (2006)).
11. See infra note 13.

12. Joseph R. Re, Partner, Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP, Remarks at the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: The Federal Circuit as an Institution (Oct. 30, 2009).
13. Replying to an earlier version of this Article, Gruner asserts that I misconstrue his view,
because his "contention ... is that patent enforcement cases settle when the parties have estimates
of probable case outcomes that differ by no more than the costs of further litigation such that it is
no longer worth continuing the litigation." Gruner, supra note 2, at 1038 (emphasis added).
Although I agree with Gruner's contention, my point about litigation costs does not concern
"probable" outcomes, but rather best-case scenarios for the patentee. Based on my experience as a
litigator, I do not believe that parties, particularly their lawyers, are more likely than not to have
similar views on case outcomes when settling. Cf Gruner,supra note 2, at 1039 ("[A]lignment of
[net] case value estimates, in conjunction with the costs of litigation, seem likely to be
determinants of case settlements at every stage of litigation."). And, contrary to Gruner's
assertion, this result does not depend on "irrational" lawyers. Id. at 1042. Rather, in many, if not
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outset of any given case, parties are often unaware of the total
amount at stake.14 This uncertainty alone-as opposed to uncertainty
in the relative merits of the case-may cause a patentee to file suit,
and the parties to continue litigation." Contrary to Gruner's assertion
that "the stakes are even larger" than "[1]itigation costs for patent
cases,"1 6 the median damages award in patent cases in jury trials is
about $3 million and only $500,000 in bench trials," while the cost
of each party litigating through trial is roughly $3 to $5 million." As
such, in a typical case, it seems very likely that as litigation unfolds,
the patentee will learn that even if it clears the infringement, validity,
and enforceability hurdles, its judgment award is not likely to exceed
the remaining costs of litigation. Assuming any injunction or
ongoing damages value to the patentee is roughly the same amount
as the actual damages award,19 a patentee is likely to make a low-ball
most, cases, settlement is primarily driven by the realization of the parties that litigation costs are
likely on the order of the maximum amount at stake in a given case, with the probabilities of
winning or losing on the merits playing a secondary role. If this is so, then many, if not most,
cases that are settled are roughly as uncertain in outcome as those that go to judgment and are
appealed. See infra Part Ill.
14. As one senior patent litigator recounts, "Patent litigation is outrageously expensive,
driven in part by the complexities of the technical and legal issues, uncertainties of claim scope,
and the amount at stake." Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off PaperPatents and Patent Trolls:
A Novel "Cold Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCl. & TECH.

407, 434 (2007); see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1105 ("It is not uncommon for the parties'
trial damages positions to vary by one and sometimes even two orders of magnitude.").
15. See Paul Fenn & Neil Rickman, Asymmetric Information and the Settlement ofInsurance

Claims, 68 J. RISK & INS. 615, 617-18 (2001) (proposing a model of tort litigation whereby
uncertainty in the amount at stake delays settlements); Ted Sichelman, Why BarringSettlement
Bars Legitimate Suits: A Reply to Rosenberg and Shavell, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 92

(2008).
16. See Gruner,supra note 2, at 1038.
17. Mary A. Woodford, Preliminary Analysis of IPLC Data: Patent Infringement Cases 25
(June 2009) (presentation on file with author). In this regard, the average award amounts-$22
million for jury trials and $3 million for bench trials-are not a reliable indicator of the amounts
at stake in a typical patent case, because these figures are skewed by a small number of very highstakes actions. Id.
18.

AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29 (2009)

(reporting that patent litigation suits with over $1 million at stake cost roughly between $3
million and $6 million).
19. Responding to an earlier version of this Article, Gruner remarks:
Patent holders will often be worried about the future enforcement of their patents,
while defendants will often be worried about the potential for business interruption
losses that are not reflected in damage recoveries at stake in present cases. . . .
Sichelman attempts to roughly estimate these further amounts at issue in patent cases
as being approximately equal to the amounts seen in case recoveries, but I see no
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settlement offer to the accused infringer; otherwise, the patentee will
simply drop the suit, and the case will end.20 If this is so, then there is
no reason to believe that parties generally agree on the likely
outcome of a judgment in most cases that settle.21
Responding to an earlier version of this Article, Gruner contends
that my "analysis may understate the dollar amounts that are claimed

reason why this relationship should hold and question whether this is a complete
estimate of overall case value.
Gruner, supra note 2, at 1040 (footnotes omitted). Gruner raises important points, but for a
variety of reasons, it seems very likely that in a typical case the costs and benefits associated with
an injunction or an ongoing damages award are likely to be of the same order as the median
judgment amount. First, for ongoing damage awards, it is likely that, on average, the remaining
years of patent life are not more than double the number of years used to calculate damages. With
the fairly reasonable assumption that-again, on average-product sales of the accused infringer
remain constant, then amounts at issue are still on the order of litigation costs. Second, although
an injunction may have significant threat value because of potential switching costs incurred by
the accused infringer, the damage award still reflects no less than the lost profits of the patentee,
which are likely to be greater than, or at least similar to, the profits earned by the infringer. See
generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup andRoyalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.

1991, 1993 (2007) (arguing that "the threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to
negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder's true economic contribution"). As such, on
average, it seems likely that the accused infringer has no more to gain each year by continuing to
sell the infringing good than the annualized lost profits collected by the patentee in any damage
award. (And this result holds even if the infringing good is a component of a larger product,
because the Federal Circuit has regularly applied the entire market value rule when calculating
lost profits. See id.) Of course, the leverage afforded the patentee from its ability to foreclose
sales of the infringing product arguably provides the patentee strong negotiating power,
particularly when the defendant's switching costs are high. Yet, even taking this leverage into
account-because the range of acceptable settlement values is constrained by the remaining
profits the accused infringer can potentially earn during the term of the patent-it seems unlikely
that settlements following injunctions would be more than five or so times the amount of awarded
lost profits. In this event, the total amount at stake is still roughly on the order of total litigation
costs through trial. Last, Gruner argues that my analysis ignores the potential cost of invalidation
of the patent-in-suit. See Gruner, supra note 2, at 1040. However, outside of the relatively
unusual situation in which the accused infringer expects a reverse settlement payment, these costs
would only reduce the effective amount at stake, making settlement more likely. In sum, although
there may be deviations from the proposition in the text, without evidence showing otherwise, it
seems fairly reasonable.
20. See Sichelman, supra note 15, at 57.
21. There are also strategic reasons that can drive settlement in a manner unrelated to party
agreement on the merits of the case. For example, patentees will often pursue a strategy in which
they start their litigation "campaign" by suing small, relatively weak defendants in order to
generate capital from settlements in order to fund the longer "war" against larger, stronger
defendants. Jacob Birnbaum, The Case for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Adoption of
an Open-Source "Bounty" System for Reviewing Business Method andSoftware Patents, in Light
of the Patent Infringement Battles Featuring the US. Financial Exchanges That Have Been
Waged in Recent Years, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 36 n.120 (2006) (noting the use of such a

strategy). These kinds of initial settlements are unlikely to be driven by the parties reaching
similar predictions regarding case outcomes.
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in patent cases because the amounts [I cite] reflect only those awards
in cases that resulted in concluded trials and ignore amounts paid in
settlements."2 2 Yet, as Gruner notes, when the total amount at stake
in a given case is relatively large, all other factors being equal, the
case is less likely to settle because remaining litigation costs are less
likely to drive the parties to settlement.23 Thus, on balance, cases that
settle most likely have lower amounts at stake than cases that result
in a judgment.2 4 As such-and even if the award reflects some
discount on the total amount requested by the patentee25 -the
maximum amount at stake in a typical patent case is probably
roughly the same as, or at least not much more than, it would cost
each party to go to trial.
Thus, any significant setback for the plaintiff-such as a loss at
claim construction or summary judgment-in a typical patent case
(i.e., one involving stakes on the order of the cost of litigation
through trial) will tend to ensure a quick settlement. In this event, the
plaintiffs odds of winning will generally dip beneath the level
needed to provide a sufficiently large net gain relative to the high
costs of continuing to litigate the case.26 As such, plaintiffs have
strong incentives to bring cases in plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions,
such as the Eastern District of Texas, where they are unlikely to lose
at the summary judgment stage and have a relatively good shot of
winning at trial.2 7 Knowing that a plaintiff is likely to make it to trial,
22. Gruner, supra note 2, at 1040.
23. Id. at 1038.
24. Of course, there are very likely a non-trivial number of cases involving extremely high
amounts at stake for which the patentee or defendant is essentially forced to settle because of
significant risk aversion. See Sichelman, supra note 15, at 87. Yet precisely because risk aversion
drives these settlements, there is no reason to believe these cases involve issues of claim
construction that the parties happen to agree upon prior to settlement.
25. Although patentees typically request much more than what is awarded at trial, it seems
reasonable to assume that both parties know that the most a judge or jury would award in practice
is much less than the requested amount of damages closer to the median awards.
26. See generally Sichelman, supra note 15.

27. Specifically, a Cornerstone research report examining nearly all patent infringement
cases filed from January 2000 to April 2008 in nine of the busiest district courts found that a large
percentage (56 percent) of all judgments in the Eastern District of Texas resulted from trials. See
Woodford, supra note 17, at 15. This figure compares with 7-26 percent in seven other districts.
Id. The 72 percent figure in the District of Delaware almost certainly results from the large
number of pharmaceutical cases filed there, nearly all of which are merely for equitable relief to
be determined by judges, who in that district apparently consolidate summary judgment and trial
proceedings in these cases for judicial efficiency. Id.
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defendants-particularly, risk-averse ones-will often settle
relatively unmeritorious suits in order to avoid litigation costs and
delays.28 In this event, interjurisdictional differences will diminish
the uniformity provided by the Federal Circuit. Specifically, judges
in different jurisdictions often decide key issues-such as claim
construction, infringement, and invalidity-in substantially different
ways. 29 Thus, cost and risk considerations will tend to induce the
parties to enter into a diverse set of forum-dependent settlements that
are unlikely to mirror the more uniform set of outcomes if the cases
had been litigated through appeal.
Indeed, the best available evidence shows forum shopping is still
a significant problem. Over the last decade, plaintiffs have
increasingly chosen the remote Eastern District of Texas, with 860
percent more cases filed there in 2009 than in 2000, while the
background growth in total cases filed nationwide was only 15
percent.o The District of Delaware, popular with pharmaceutical
company plaintiffs, grew in filings by 141 percent from 2000 to
2009.31 Moreover, a sophisticated empirical study by the economists
Scott Atkinson, Alan Marco, and John Turner found that horizontal
nonuniformity (measured by the variance of invalidity rates across
district courts in different circuits) substantially decreased-but still
remains-following the creation of the Federal Circuit.32 Although
28. See Sichelman, supra note 15, at 58. See generally David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell,
A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3
(1985).

29. This contention is based on my personal experience as a patent litigator and various
anecdotes of former colleagues. Moreover, studies such as Professor Schwartz's-which show a
wide variety of reversal rates on claim construction for different judicial districts-empirically
support, though perhaps do not confirm, this belief. See David Schwartz, Claim Construction
Reversal

Rates

I-Overall

Reversal

Rates,

PATENTLY-O,

http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/02/claim-construct.html;

Feb.

27,

2008,

see also Kimberly A. Moore,

Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV.

889 (2001) (describing the wide divergence in patent case outcomes and settlement rates among
the district courts).
30. Lex Machina "Courts," http://www.lexmachina.com/courts?filter=Patent(last visited

Apr. 10, 2010).
31. Id.
32. Scott Atkinson, Alan Marco & John Turner, The Economics of a CentralizedJudiciary:
Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the FederalCircuit,52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 421 (2009) (finding

the variance of the circuits' validity rates was six times as large prior to the creation of the
Federal Circuit). This study also found no evidence of forum shopping on the basis of validity
rates after 1978. Id. at 438. Although my personal experience as a litigator causes me to question
this finding, there is no doubt that forum shopping exists on the basis of other variables,
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the Federal Circuit in cases like In re TS Tech33 has provided some
hope for reducing forum shopping by promoting the transfer of cases
with stronger connections to other jurisdictions,34 ultimately, some
defendants will always be stuck in "renegade" jurisdictions. Thus,
horizontal nonuniformity cannot merely be solved through antiforum
shopping rules.
Second, although the empirical data are relatively limited, there
is a fairly widespread belief that Federal Circuit decisions are highly
"panel-dependent." Although later in this Article I cast doubt on the
soundness of this assertion for most areas of patent law, it appears
that panel-dependence very likely plays a role in the critical area of
claim construction.3 5 If this is so, then district courts can, as one
former colleague quipped, "pick and choose" from the Federal
Circuit's repository of conflicting claim construction precedents.36 In
effect, this sort of malleability provides room for trial judges to more
easily tailor outcomes to suit their personal tastes. Because most
litigants decide to settle instead of litigating through an appeal,
particularly whether a court is likely to grant summary judgment and the expected time to trial.
See, e.g., David J.F. Gross et al., The Secret of a Good BluffIs Not to Bluff Using Trial Vision to
Settle Your Case, in 1 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 370 (PLI Order No. 19028, Sept.-Nov. 2009).

The large percentage of cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas is ample proof of such an
assertion. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Moore, supra note 29, at 903-04
(noting the aggregation ofpatent cases in a relatively small number ofjurisdictions).
33. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

34. See id; see also In re Nintendo Co., Ltd., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (granting writ
of mandamus to transfer patent infringement action out of the Eastern District of Texas); In re
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same); In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc.,
545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (same).
35. Replying to an earlier version of this Article, Professor Gruner asserts that I "fail[] to
include in [my] analysis" that the "forum selection ... [and] panel differences in determining
patent case outcomes . . . are themselves probably the result of case selection effects." Gruner,
supra note 2, at 1042. Although I agree that selection effects in settlement likely account for some
of the differences in particular forum and panel outcomes, it appears unlikely that these effects
fully account for the differences. As for forum-specific effects, presumably, patentees would not
have rushed into the Eastern District of Texas over the last ten years if the differential rates of
decision on summary judgment and trial merely reflected the results of settlement selection by the
parties, as opposed to actual differences in judicial standards and related decision making in that
forum. On this basis, Gruner cannot merely posit that selection effects may in principle explain
the differences. Rather, because the most plausible account points to real forum-specific
differences, it is arguably his burden to provide some evidence to empirically support his
alternative explanation. As for panel-specific effects, on similar reasoning, I reject Gruner's
contention in Part III, infra.
36. Communication from Anonymous Law Firm Partner to Ted Sichelman (2006).
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panel-dependence thwarts the aims of horizontal uniformity (as well
as vertical uniformity, which I address in the next part).
In sum, although the Federal Circuit has greatly improved
horizontal uniformity, forum shopping remains a pernicious feature
of the patent litigation landscape.37 To be sure, strict oversight by the
Federal Circuit in policing transfer motions, as well as more
uniformity within that court, will help the cause. Yet because the
high-cost structure of patent infringement actions means the district
court is the de facto court of last resort in most cases, horizontal
nonuniformity is very likely to remain an endemic aspect of patent
litigation.
III. MYTH #2: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S REVERSAL RATES FOR
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ARE NOT PROBLEMATIC

David Schwartz's tireless analysis of over 1,200 opinions and
related briefs shows that the reversal rate for claim construction at
the Federal Circuit was at a low of roughly 20 percent before the
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments
(Markman I).38 The reversal rate grew to about 25 percent shortly
following Markman II, hit a high of about 32 percent following
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,39 and has averaged 28
percent in the years since then.40 Granted, Schwartz needs to finalize
his multivariate regressions to control for a variety of variables to
definitively tie the increase in reversal rates to the doctrinal shifts
implemented in Markman II and Cybor." Yet, these post-Markman
II numbers are, at least on the surface, abnormally high given that the

37. See
shopping).
38. 517
39. 138
40. See

Moore, supra note 29, at 924-27 (noting the variety of costs imposed by forum
U.S. 370 (1996).
F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1093-94. Importantly, Schwartz includes vacated and

remanded cases in these rates. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical
Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223, 248-49

(2008) [hereinafter Schwartz, PracticeMakes Perfect?]. See also E-mail from David L. Schwartz
to Ted Sichelman (Apr. 22, 2009) (on file with author).
41. See David L. Schwartz, Presentation at Northwestern University School of Law, Searle
Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth: Research Roundtable on Empirical Studies of
Patent Litigation (Nov. 12, 2009) (on file with author).
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average issue-by-issue reversal rate at the Federal Circuit, excluding
claim construction, is only about 18 percent.4 2
Richard Gruner makes an admirable effort to explain this
higher-than-normal reversal rate as the result of "selection bias."43
Specifically, he argues that the kinds of cases involving claim
construction at the Federal Circuit are inherently more uncertain than
the ordinary patent infringement case filed in district court." Thus, in
Gruner's view, the seemingly high reversal rates should not be cause
for alarm.45 Although I believe that at least a portion of the high
reversal rates reflects the selection of the most uncertain cases for
appeal, for several reasons, selection bias is very unlikely to explain
the entirety of the high rates.
First, based on the best available data, it appears that the
background reversal rate for all areas of federal civil litigationincluding summary affirmances-is roughly 18 percent,46 compared
42.
43.
44.
45.

See infra PartIII & figure 1.
Gruner, supra note 2.
See id. at 1007.
See id. at 1009.

46. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts:
Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947, 951-52

(2002) (showing an 18 percent civil reversal rate, including partial affirmances). The ClermontEisenberg rates, like the rates from Schwartz and Moore, see infra note 47, appear to count all
summary affirmances. See infra note 55. However, there is a concern that the Clermont-Eisenberg
rates are too old to be reliable. Unfortunately, unlike Clermont and Eisenberg's data, the most
comprehensive recent data on reversal rates-which is compiled by the Administrative Office of
the Courts (AO)-does not include partial affirmances in the reversal rate. See infra note 51 and
accompanying text. However, Corey Yung calculated separate reversal rates that-while
excluding summary affirmances-included and excluded partial affirmances. See infra note 54.
Using Yung's ratio of the two reversal rates, the Clermont-Eisenberg reversal rate adjusted to
exclude partial affirmances would be roughly 11-12 percent, which is about the same as the most
recent private civil reversal rates of 12-15 percent. See Administrative Office of the Courts, Table
B-5, U.S. Courts of Appeals-Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit During the 12Month Period Ending March 31, 2009, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2009/tables/BO5MarO9.pdf
[hereinafter
AO,
Appeals
Terminated 2009] (reporting the reversal rates in a variety of civil cases across all circuits except
the Federal Circuit); Administrative Office of the Courts, Table B-5, U.S. Courts of AppealsAppeals Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31,
2008, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2008/tables/
BO5MarO8.pdf (same); Administrative Office of the Courts, Table B-5, U.S. Courts of AppealsAppeals Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31,
2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2007/tables/
BO5MarO7.pdf (same).
This result provides strong evidence that the civil reversal rate has remained fairly
constant over time. In any event, even if the civil reversal rate has increased, the remaining
comparisons in this section indicate that the claim construction reversal rate is unduly high.
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with about 28-32 percent for claim construction cases.47 Similarly,
Corey Yung-who performed an exhaustive analysis of civil
litigation reversal rates (including partial affirmances but excluding
summary affirmances)-found an average reversal rate for all cases
of 26.2 percent (including remands),48 which is substantially less than
the 41 percent reversal rate for claim construction cases that do not
result in summary affirmances.4 9 When Yung limited his data to civil
cases on de novo review in 2008, his rate only increased slightly, to
26.6 percent." Of course, one could argue that claim construction
reversal rates should be compared with rates in the most complex of
civil cases, such as securities, bankruptcy, contract, or similar
actions. Unfortunately, it appears that most of the available data on
these narrow classes of cases are sparse, outdated, or unreliable."
47. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1093; see also Schwartz, PracticeMakes Perfect?, supra
note 40, at 249 ("29.7% of the cases had to be reversed, vacated, and/or remanded because of an
erroneous claim construction."); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable?,9 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 231, 239 (2005) ("In the cases in
which one or more term was wrongly construed, the erroneous claim construction required the
Federal Circuit to reverse or vacate the district court's judgment in 29.7% of the cases.").
Schwartz's and Moore's claim construction studies are the only ones to comprehensively account
for Rule 36 summary affirmances in calculating reversal rates. See Gruner,supra note 2, at 99698, 1000. Because other studies have failed to do so, their reported reversal rates are inflated. See
id.
48. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1434742.
49. E-mail from David L. Schwartz to Ted Sichelman (Jan. 8, 2009) (on file with author)
(stating that the reversal rate in Schwartz's data set was 41 percent excluding Rule 36 summary
affirmances).
50. E-mail from David L. Schwartz to Ted Sichelman (Oct. 25, 2009) (on file with author)
(relaying the results of unpublished analysis by Yung that segmented appeals by standard of
review).
51. Using data from the AO, one study of Seventh Circuit reversal rates from 1982-87 found
the total civil reversal rate (apparently including remands) to be 27.3 percent. Daniel Kessler,
Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 252
(1996). The researchers do not state whether they count partial affirmances in the reversal rate.
See id. at 249. Even if they had, given the large disparity between this rate and the 18 percent
overall civil reversal rate of Clermont and Eisenberg (which very likely includes all partial and
summary affirmances), either the 1980s AO data excluded some summary affirmances or reversal
rates have simply decreased. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 952. Of course, the
Seventh Circuit could have had a substantially higher reversal rate than the average among the
regional circuits in the 1980s, but given current data, such a large disparity seems very unlikely.
See, e.g., AO, Appeals Terminated 2009, supra note 46 (reporting that the highest private civil
reversal rate for any circuit was no more than 25 percent greater than the national average).
For similar reasons, a study from the late 1980s by Judge Jon 0. Newman finding a civil
reversal rate in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals of 27 percent is unlikely to represent a figure
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The most reliable and current data were compiled by the
Administrative Office of the Courts (AO). The data report that the
reversal rate of bankruptcy cases in fiscal year 2009 was 16.1
percent.52 Although this figure includes summary affirmances, unlike
Schwartz's reversal rates, it does not include partial affirmances.5 3
However, using the different rates (i.e., with and without partial
affirmances) calculated by Yung for total civil reversals as a guide,54
the bankruptcy reversal rate including partial affirmances would be
roughly 25 percent, still noticeably lower than the claim construction
reversal rates.
A relatively exhaustive study by Professors Kevin Clermont and
Ted Eisenberg, albeit with AO data from 1988 to 1997, calculated
reversal rates-including partial and apparently summary
affirmances-for securities and contract cases. Each of these
categories has relatively high reversal rates-29.4 percent and 22.8
percent, respectively-fairly close to, but still lower than, the claim
construction rates.
Second, on an issue-by-issue basis, the Federal Circuit reverses
lower court claim construction rulings much more than most other
issues. 56 In particular, figure 1 shows average reversal rates at the
Federal Circuit from 2000 to 2007 on an issue-by-issue basis for
those issues appealed in at least twenty cases during this time period.
The claim construction rates are derived from Schwartz's study.57 I

worthy of comparison. See Jon 0. Newman, Study: A Study ofAppellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L.

REv. 629, 632 (1992).
52. AO, Appeals Terminated 2009, supra note 46.
53. See id.

54. E-mail from David L. Schwartz to Ted Sichelman (Apr. 22, 2010) (forwarding analysis
by Corey Yung showing a 16.5 percent civil reversal rate when excluding partial affirmances).
55. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 954-55. The Clermont-Eisenberg overall
civil litigation reversal rate was 18 percent, which is about the same as the latest AO rates when
accounting for partial affirmances. See id.; supra note 46. Since this figure is significantly lower
than the Yung rates, this is strong evidence that the Clermont-Eisenberg and the latest AO data
includes most or all of the summary affirmances. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 46, at
952.
56. See infra figure 1.
57. See Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 40; Schwartz, supra note 4. In

calculating the claim construction issue-by-issue reversal rates, I aggregate the appellate decision
on all claim terms into one "issue," counting partial affirmances with remands as reversals. Of
course, treating each claim as a separate "issue" would increase the disparity in reversal rates
between claim construction and other issues.
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assembled the remaining data from the University of Houston Law
Center's U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics project," which purports to
contain data on all Federal Circuit opinions, including Rule 36
summary affirmances.59
FIGURE 1
REVERSAL RATES BY ISSUE AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

(2000-2007)
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As figure 1 shows, the average reversal rate60 across all issues
other than claim construction is 18 percent, and 21 percent for all
issues including claim construction.6 1 Claim construction (at 33
percent) is near the top,6 2 only below section 102(a) anticipation (38
58.

U.S. PATENT LITIGATION STATISTICS PROJECT, UNIV.

OF HOUSTON LAW CTR.,

available at http://www.patstats.org [hereinafter PATSTATS] (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
59. See id. Because the reversal rate substantially dropped between 2000-2004 and 20052007 in the Houston data set, it appears that the 2000-2004 data may be missing some (or all) of
the summary affirmances. Thus, the reversal rates presented below-other than the claim
construction rate, which was independently derived by David Schwartz-may be slightly inflated,
which only strengthens the argument made here that the claim construction rate is unduly high.
60. The average rates are weighted by the total of number of cases involving each issue on
appeal.
61. E-mail from David L. Schwartz to Ted Sichelman (Dec. 29, 2009) (on file with author)
(describing claim construction reversal rates from 2000-2007).
62. Id. (showing that the reversal rate on a term-by-term basis was 33 percent during 20002007).
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percent) and indefiniteness (38 percent)-which, to boot, are two
issues that are heavily dependent on claim construction.63 Nor is the
high rate a reflection of the de novo standard of review for claim
construction issues; many of the issues with lower percentages also
receive de novo review, such as enablement, 64 obviousness, 65 and all
appeals from summary judgment.6 6
Gruner contends that the overall issue-by-issue reversal rates
present an incomplete picture, because reversal rates for patentees
and accused infringers can differ vastly on the same issue.67 Figures 2
and 3 show the reversal rates for patentees and accused infringers
that won at the district court level for the same issues as in figure 1.

63. In this regard, because multiple issues can be decided in one case on appeal, a reversal
on claim construction could, for example, lead immediately to a reversal on indefiniteness. See,
e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("Indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112 2 is an issue of claim construction and a question of law
that we review de novo."). In this instance, the data above would reflect a reversal in both the
claim construction and indefiniteness categories. The same methodology applies across all cases
with multiple issues. See PATSTATS, supra note 58 (noting that decisions on separate issues are
separately coded).
64. E.g, AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
65. E.g, PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2007). Several other studies have calculated obviousness reversal rates. Although the aim of this
Article is not to exhaustively review and compare the results of these studies to the figures
calculated here, taking into account the differing years and data sets of these studies, the results
are roughly equivalent. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit:
An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911, 931-32 (2007)

(reporting a 45 percent reversal rate, including vacations, for 2002-05, but probably not including
all Rule 36 opinions); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and
Patentability:An EmpiricalAssessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2051, 2077

(2007) (calculating a 35 percent reversal rate, including vacations, for obviousness for 19902005, but excluding Rule 36 opinions).
66. E.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
67. E-mail from Richard S. Gruner to Ted Sichelman (Nov. 30, 2009) (on file with author);
see also Gruner,supra note 2, at 1060-61.
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In this regard, Gruner suggests that the patentee average reversal
rate may be significantly higher than the accused infringer rate,
because patentees often have more at stake on appeal than accused
infringers. Specifically, he notes that an invalidity determination on
appeal wipes out the entire value of the patent for the patentee, which
should induce patentees to bring weaker appeals on invalidity issues
relative to accused infringers. These weaker appeals are more likely
to be reversed by the Federal Circuit. On this ground, Gruner
contends that the claim construction reversal rates should not be as
troubling when viewed in the context of party-specific rates.69
As an initial matter, Gruner's position is only partially borne out
by the data. Supporting his view, the reversal rate on section 102(a)
prior art issues is 41 percent for appealing patentees and 31 percent
for appealing accused infringers; for on-sale bar issues, 30 percent
and 9 percent; for 102(g) art, 15 percent and 10 percent; and for
indefiniteness, 44 percent and 24 percent. Yet, the rate for
obviousness is 21 percent for appealing patentees versus 29 percent
for appealing accused infringers; for 102(b) public use bars, 19
percent and 20 percent; and for 102(b) patent and publication bars,
18 and 20 percent. Thus, at least for some important issues that are
appealed fairly often, appealing patentees do better than appealing
accused infringers.
Moreover, the overall difference in average reversal rates across
all issues for appealing patentees and accused infringers is fairly low.
Specifically, the average issue-by-issue reversal rate (excluding
claim construction) is 18 percent (when both parties are included), 20
percent (when only winning patentees are included), and 16 percent
(when only winning accused infringers are included). Recall that the
claim construction reversal rate for winning patentees and accused
infringers (treated separately) is 33 percent alike. Thus, the claim
construction reversal rate is still substantially higher than the either
the average winning patentee or accused infringer reversal rates. As
such, the slight asymmetry in reversal rates disaggregated by party
does not appear to diminish the cause for concern.

68. Gruner, supra note 2, at 1022.
69. See id. at 1059-63.
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At the symposium associated with this issue, Jeffrey Lefstin
suggested that the claim construction reversal rate might fall on the
high end because it is an issue that often must be decided by an
appellate court before reaching other issues. 0 Expanding upon this
rationale, one might surmise that rates for other issues are low,
because the Federal Circuit can fully dispose of a case merely by
reversing on claim construction (and a related issue like validity or
infringement), without reaching most of the other issues on appeal.
Specifically, in the event claim construction is not reversed, the
appealing party has an arguably weaker-than-average case, which
could explain lower reversal rates for other issues. There may be
some force to this argument, but like Gruner's "selection effect"
rationale, it is unlikely to explain the full increase for claim
construction over the baseline reversal rate.
Although claim construction issues were decided in 744 appeals
between 2000 and 2007,71 direct infringement and issues relating to
the doctrine of equivalents were decided in 672 and 379 cases, 72
respectively, but each had a relatively low reversal rate of 15
percent.7 3 One might retort that claim construction issues are more
complicated than infringement concerns. Yet, other seemingly
complex issues-such as lost profits, written description,
enablement, indirect infringement, and the doctrine of equivalentshave lower reversal rates.74 Moreover, such an explanation does not
rebut the descriptive hypothesis that claim construction reversal rates
are abnormally high. While more data are needed on the rates of
appealed issues relative to decided issues at the Federal Circuit to
make a conclusive determination on Lefstin's suggestion, until such
an analysis is available, there appears to be no strong reason to
believe that the centrality of claim construction wholly accounts for
its high reversal rates.

70. Ted Sichelman, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: The

Federal Circuit as an Institution (Oct. 30, 2009) (audience question following author's
presentation).
71. E-mail from David L. Schwartz to Ted Sichelman (Nov. 29, 2009) (on file with author).
72. These figures were compiled with the same University of Houston data set. See supra
note 58.
73. See suprafigure 1.
74. See id.
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The issue-by-issue data are also consistent with the case-by-case
reversal rate in fiscal year 2009 for the Federal Circuit, which was
about 15 percent in patent actions appealed from district courts."
These figures compare with a reversal rate of 21 percent from the
Court of International Trade, 14 percent from the Court of Appeals
for Veterans' Claims, 8 percent for the Merit Systems Protection
Board, and 17 percent for the Court of Federal Claims.7 ' Thus, the
claim construction rate is much higher than the average reversal rate
for all patent cases and higher than the reversal rates in other types of
actions.
Third, based on Schwartz's data, it appears that reversal rates
rose after Markman I and Cybor." A selection effect theory would
need to explain this apparent increase on the basis of shifting
settlement patterns. Although effective settlement rates increased
slightly during this period (from 84 percent to 89 percent),79 this
small increase is unlikely to explain the relatively large increase
(from 20 percent to 32 percent) in reversal rates over the same time
frame." There is no other indication offered by Gruner that the types
of patent cases filed in federal court can explain this increase.
Indeed, preliminary multivariate regression tests performed by
Schwartz show no explanatory effects from other likely variables."
In sum, surely a portion of the increase in claim construction
reversal rates relative to average rates for civil cases and other patent
issues is likely attributable to selection effects and higher rates of

75. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Affirmance and Reversal Rates for
District
Court
Patent
Infringement
Appeals,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/
AffirmanceReversalRatesdct.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
76. See Table B-8, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed,
Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 2009
[hereinafter CAFC Appeals 2009], http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep09.pdf.
77. As I explain more fully in Part IV, infra, these reversal rates-including the patent case
rate-do not include partial affirmances and are calculated in a way that artificially reduces the
reported rates. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text. However, even using the adjusted
reversal rate that I calculate below, which is roughly 20-25 percent, the claim construction
reversal rate is still significantly greater. See id.
78. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1093.
79. Kesan & Ball, supra note 10, at 271.
80. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1093.
81. See Schwartz, supra note 41.
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appeal.82 However, these explanations do not appear to account for
the full increase. Although complexity may play some role, this
theory does not appear to fully explain the increase either, because
the claim construction reversal rates are higher than those for other
types of complex cases and for most other complex patent issues.
Nor do settlement outcomes appear to be immune from
uncertainty in claim construction. Although roughly 85 percent of
patent cases effectively settle,83 they of course do so in the proverbial
"shadow of the law," which includes best estimates of what would
happen at judgment.84 While supposed agreement on results may
drive settlement, as I noted earlier, the likely culprit in many (if not
most) settlements is the high costs of litigation, which will often lead
to settlement regardless of whether the parties agree on outcomes. 85
In this sense, uncertainty in claim construction outcomes may distort
settlement amounts from the optimal result. Moreover, based on
some rough calculations, it appears that about 25 percent of all patent
cases enter the Markman phase,86 and about 60 percent of those cases
82. However, contrary to Gruner's contention, it seems unlikely that any sizable selection
effects result from parties settling cases following oral argument. See Gruner, supra note 2, at
1024-29. Specifically, once argument is heard, the parties' appeals costs are effectively sunk,
since the likelihood of the case reaching the Supreme Court or being reheard at the Federal
Circuit is relatively small (and the costs of filing and responding to a petition for certiorari or
rehearing are generally low). In this event, there are essentially little to no litigation-cost savings
to the parties from settling following oral argument, but prior to final judgment. Because it is
presumably unusual for delay in judgment to force a settlement, it seems nearly all cases that
reach oral argument will result in a judgment. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and
Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on

Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 707-08 (2000) (discussing incentives to
settle cases following panel announcement in the context of the Priest-Klein hypothesis).
83. Kesan & Ball, supra note 10, at 271.
84. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The
Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).

85. Thus, I disagree with Gruner's contention that "[c]laim interpretations are so
fundamental to establishing a basis for patent scope and patent enforcement value that it is hard to
understand how the parties to a dispute would reach similar case value estimates and agree to case
settlements unless the two parties reached parallel and similar conclusions about claim scope ...
as part of their analyses leading to their settlement agreements." Gruner, supra note 2, at 1036,
see also id at 1039 ("Claim construction standards have a key and largely successful role in
guiding the case value estimates of disputing parties to sufficiently similar levels to produce
settlements."). Rather, when parties settle primarily because the total stakes are roughly the same
or less than remaining litigation costs, which appear to be a large percentage of settled cases,
there is no need for parties to reach similar predictions on the outcomes of underlying claim
construction issues. See supra Part II.
86. About 33 percent of patent infringement case dockets for cases filed in 2006 and 2007
contained the terms "Markman," "claim construction," or "claim interpretation." See Westlaw,
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result in appealable orders.8 1 Yet it seems only about 15-25 percent
of these latter cases settle after the Markman phase but before
summary judgment or trial." This relatively high number of cases
entering the Markman phase shows that claim construction is an
important aspect of the case for many litigants, but the relatively low
settlement rates indicate that Markman orders do not have much
force in providing the litigants with added certainty in outcomes. 89
Despite all of these arguments, replying to an earlier version of
this Article, Gruner remains unconvinced. Specifically, he argues
that the differences in claim construction reversal rates from those of
other civil cases and other patent law issues do "not establish that
selection effects are not at work in determining these rates."90 I fully
agree with Professor Gruner that my analysis here does not
disprove-in a statistically significant and robust empirical
manner-that settlement selection effects fully explain the
differential in claim construction reversal rates. Yet Gruner also
admits that his analysis does not prove otherwise.9 1 Thus, the
question becomes, given our limited available data, which account is
more plausible. A simple hypothetical sheds some light on the
CourtExpress database (searched Jan. 11, 2010). This number most likely overestimates the
number of cases that actually enter the Markman phase, because it likely includes cases with
scheduling orders mentioning these phrases but that never reached briefing. See id. Based on a
fairly exhaustive study calculating the rate of appealable Markman orders in patent infringement
cases, via extrapolation, I adjusted the percentage reported in the text downward to 25 percent.
See Joshua H. Walker & Xiangnong "George" Wang, U.S. Claim Construction Orders 2004

2008, LANDSLIDE, July/Aug. 2009, at 27 (reporting that roughly 14.5 percent of cases filed result
in a claim construction order); infra note 87.
87. This percentage was generated by searching for "(Markman /10 order) OR (Markman
/10 "claim construction") OR ("claim interpretation" /10 order)" on Westlaw's CourtExpress
database for patent infringement cases filed in 2006 and 2007.
88. About 11-12 percent of all cases in recent years went to summary judgment or trial.
UNIv. OF HOUSTON LAW CTR., PATSTATS, http://www.patstats.org/2008fy Patent Case
Disposition Modes.doc (last visited Jan. 9, 2010). Using the 14-15 percent Markman order rate,
this means that about 15-25 percent of cases settle after Markman, but before summary judgment
or trial. In a non-scientific survey by the American Bar Association, attorneys reported that 29
percent of their cases settled following a Markman hearing. Although this number is slightly
higher than the percentage I found in my quick study, it is still relatively low given that claim
construction orders tend to eliminate disputes on many dispositive issues. See 1999 ABA Section
of Intellectual Property Law, 1999 Markman Survey, 18 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. I.P.L. 3 (2000).
89. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent

Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743, 1762 (2009) ("And the prospect of appellate
reversal may keep the parties litigating even after the Markman ruling.").
90. Gruner, supra note 2, at 1059.
91. See id
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answer. Suppose for a minute that the Federal Circuit actually rolls a
pair of dice to decide the outcome of claim construction appeals. If
the number that appears is five or less, then the decision below is
reversed; otherwise, it is affirmed. In this scenario, no matter what
selection effects are at work, the reversal rate is a stable and high 28
percent,9 2 and due entirely to inherent randomness in adjudication at
the Federal Circuit. Yet, in the absence of being able to draw back
the curtain to directly witness the Federal Circuit's dice rolls,
Gruner's story of selection effects is completely consistent with such
an outcome. As Gruner argues, "[t]he impact of selection effects ...
varies with factors such as stake asymmetry ... [,] the uncertainty of
the parties in estimating the quality of their cases and case
outcomes," endowment effects, relative risk-aversion, and a variety
of other factors that, taken together, can result in a 28 percent
reversal rate.93 Indeed, with all of these factors at play, no matter
what the Federal Circuit does on appeal-even if it adopts a rule that
patentees always win-Gruner's selection effects theory could
explain the outcome.94 In a sense, Gruner's approach is like a
conspiracy theory-it finds the same result no matter what
underlying facts are introduced to rebut it.
And it is exactly because of the flexibility of Gruner's approach
that we should be wary of it. Other than Gruner asserting that some
of the data presented above are dubious because they were derived
from different sources-and I noted this limitation, which I do not
believe to be of significant import-he does not directly contest any
of my arguments. Instead, he simply contends that my story does not
foreclose an alternative view whereby selection effects in settlement
account for the seemingly high claim construction reversal rates. 95
Yet, given that claim construction reversal rates are (1) generally

92. See Statistics of Dice Throw, http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/lHbase/Math/dice.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
93. Gruner, supra note 2, at 1059.
94. See id. at 1059 ("[I]f a change in these rates were to be detected, its source would need to
be found in appellate case selection processes, not the sorts of factors mentioned that do not
substantially influence claim construction reversal rates.").
95. See id. ("[T]he fact that the reversal rates differ for several different types of cases does
not establish that selection effects are not at work in determining these rates.").
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higher than reversal rates for other patent law issues,96 and (2) higher
than reversal rates for other types of complex cases,97 the most
straightforward inference is that the rates are probably abnormally
high. As such, the burden should be on Gruner to provide a causal,
empirically supported account of how his explains-in-principle-alloutcomes theory specifically rebuts this inference. As such, we
should find that the best data available today-which show about a
30 percent reversal rate-raise a substantial cause for concern over
the cases that are reversed on claim construction grounds.98 Although
some portion of the reversal rate is surely attributable to the
uncertain nature of appeals and the complexity of the issues, it
appears that "remedial" work by the Federal Circuit could
substantially reduce the rate. It is to this and related issues that I turn
next.
IV. MYTH #3: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS
DRASTICALLY INCREASED VERTICAL NONUNIFORMITY
Taking the opposite tack to Gruner, as noted earlier,
appear to complain that an appeal to the Federal Circuit is a
flip," with outcomes that are overly dependent on the specific
of judges selected to decide a given appeal.99 Although

many
"coin
panel
claim

96. Gruner contends that "the claim construction reversal rates shown in Professor
Sichelman's figures 2 and 3 (where rates for plaintiffs and defendants are properly disaggregated
to reflect their different interests and circumstances as they pursue appeals from adverse results at
trial) are at about the middle of the range for patent issues generally." Id at 1061. While a few
more issues have substantially higher reversal rates when disaggregated by party, claim
construction rates are still noticeably higher than average for both appealing patentees (33 percent
vs. 13 percent) and accused infringers (33 percent vs. 24 percent). See supra figures 2 & 3. Thus,
Gruner's contention does not rebut my arguments.
97. See supranotes 53-55 and accompanying text.
98. Although I agree with Gruner that "studies of Federal Circuit reversal rates across
diverse patent law issues . . . would benefit from the consideration of key control variables ...
like stake asymmetry of the parties potentially . . . and differing abilities of the parties to evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of their cases," infra Part V, I strongly disagree that "we should, for
now, leave it at that," and ignore the seemingly high claim construction reversal rate until these
more definitive studies are completed. Gruner, supra note 2, at 1063. Rather, given the high costs
of uncertainty and inaccuracy in the claim construction process, it is essential to make
inferences-as long as they are reasonably supported, which they are here-from the best
available data in order to guide policymaking. Cf Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate
Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1539 (2009) ("The question for
policymakers, after all, should be whether or not the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of
action.").
99. See supra note 1; Donald R. Dunner, Partner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett &
Dunner, LLP, Washington, D.C., Remarks by Donald Dunner at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
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construction reversal rates may be abnormally high, the best
available data do not support these views for most other patent law
issues appealed to the Federal Circuit. As an initial matter, my sense
is that many litigators and in-house counsel who regularly appear
before the Federal Circuit engage in their own sort of "selection
bias." Specifically, they very likely forget the predictable-and recall
the unpredictable-outcomes of their cases in front of the Federal
Circuit."oo On a related note, my guess is that many litigators tend to
"drink their own Kool-Aid." Specifically, because of an attorney's
interest in zealously representing a client, he may become biased,
making it difficult to predict the outcome of an otherwise predictable
case."' Of course, there are several purely quantitative reasons to
back up my position.
First, the reported background reversal rate (excluding partial
affirmances) at the Federal Circuit is no more than 15 to 18 percent
on a case-by-case basis.102 This rate is roughly the same as the
Review Symposium: The Federal Circuit as an Institution (Oct. 30, 2009) ("Predictability within
the Federal Circuit is not uniform over the twenty-seven years of the Federal Circuit. When the
Federal Circuit was first formed, I felt I could almost always predict the outcome of the case in
which I was involved. In 2009, that level has dropped ... and the reason is that, like other courts,
this court's decisions are very much panel-dependent.").
100. See Michael Kubovy, On the Pleasuresof the Mind, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATION
OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 138 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 2003) (describing the tendency of

people to recall outlier, rather than average, events).
101. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers' Ability to Predict
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 133 (2010) (finding in an empirical study of

litigated cases that lawyers were overconfident in their predictions of case outcomes); Cassandra
Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REv. 1, 31-43 (2009)

(describing the sorts of "biases [that] render the lawyer unable to either offer neutral advice or to
accurately predict how decision makers will respond to various avenues of advocacy").
Paul Morgan raises another interesting possibility explaining the relatively low reversal
rates: delay. In particular, he writes, "But also where a party is facing a product injunction, or an
in-house counsel is facing a possible career impa[ir]ment for losing at the [d]istrict [c]ourt [which
is harder to predict], an appeal can delay the disaster, and the CAFC seems to hardly ever
sanctions appeals for being frivolous even when they should." Ted Sichelman, Are Appeals at the
Federal Circuit a "Coin Flip"?, PATENTLY-O, Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/

2010/04/are-appeals-at-the-federal-circuit-a-coin-flip.html?cid=6a00d8341c588553ef0133ec9448
df970b (comment from Paul F. Morgan).
102. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. As a point of additional comparison, the
Federal Circuit's average reversal rates-across all types of cases, not just patent actions-is
below 15 percent (excluding partial affirmances). See CAFC Appeals 2009, supra note 76
(reporting a reversal rate of 11 percent); Table B-8, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ended
September
30,
2008,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/
b08sepO8.pdf (reporting a reversal rate of 13 percent); Table B-8, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period
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reported reversal rate for private civil cases in other circuits."o'
Importantly, however, these reversal rates for the Federal Circuit and
for the regional circuits do not include partial affirmances that result
in remands. In response to a shorter version of this Article posted to
the popular blog, Patently-O, Professor Mark Lemley remarked, "If
you treat [the partial affirmances] as reversals, you would find that
the full affirmance rate . . . is 50-60%, which sounds like a coin flip

to me."104 In response to Professor Lemley's critique, I performed a
separate analysis of reversal rates by examining individual patent
cases decided in fiscal year 2008 by the Federal Circuit.1 o5 In so
doing, I discovered that the reversal rates reported by the Federal
Circuit apparently are derived from not only substantive orders, but
motions and many other types of dispositions.106 As such, the Federal
Circuit's reported "partial affirmance" rates are not a reliable
indicator of the percentage of cases effectively reversed.
Excluding nonsubstantive orders, based on my review of the
underlying case data for fiscal year 2008 and extrapolating from that
to other years, it appears that roughly only 10 to 15 percent of the
cases are partially affirmed and remanded," instead of the 20 to 25
percent reported by the Federal Circuit. On the other hand, excluding
the nonsubstantive orders raises the overall reversal rate to roughly
20 to 25 percent, not the 10 to 20 percent reported by the Federal
Circuit. Thus, if one includes partial affirmances in the overall
reversal rate for substantive orders, the Federal Circuit's reversal rate

Ended September 30, 2007, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/
/b08sepO7.pdf (reporting a reversal rate of 14 percent).
103. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Although the Federal Circuit's reported rates
are not properly calculated, see infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text, it appears that the
other regional circuits use the same misguided methodology. See id. Thus, a comparison of the
reported rates is instructive.
104. Sichelman, supranote 101 (comments of Mark Lemley).
105. In particular, I retrieved and hand-coded patent cases in both Westlaw's "CTAF" and
"FIPPAT-CS" databases issued from October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008.
106. In addition, it appears that the Federal Circuit counts as separate "cases" each of
potentially multiple docket numbers assigned to a single actual case decided on appeal. See
generally E-mail from David L. Schwartz to Ted Sichelman (May 10, 2010) (on file with author)
(relaying the remarks of Paul Janicke to David Schwartz regarding the AO calculations on
terminated and pending cases at the Federal Circuit).
107. In this regard, about 85 percent of all partial affirmances in substantive orders were
remanded in FY-2008 for further consideration.
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is a relatively high 30 to 35 percent.o Indeed, this number is higher
than the reversal rates for other types of complex appeals-such as
contracts, securities, and bankruptcy-which range from 20 to 30
percent.109
On this ground, are appeals at the Federal Circuit indeed a "coin
flip"? There are at least three reasons to generally answer this
question in the negative. One, even though the 30 to 35 percent
reversal rate for the Federal Circuit's substantive orders is higher
than the reversal rates for securities, contract, and bankruptcy
cases-all between 20 to 30 percent-it appears that the AO data set
used by Clermont and Eisenberg to calculate these rates includes
nonsubstantive orders. Thus, if one were to exclude the
nonsubstantive orders for these types of complex cases, it seems
likely that their reversal rates would rise to about the level of the
Federal Circuit's substantive patent case reversal rate.
Two, attorneys-or, at least, neutral observers-should be able
to predict to a much more accurate degree the outcome in any given
case than the average reversal rate. Specifically, they know the
applicable law and facts, as well as any special circumstances of their
particular cases. Thus, one would expect that the ability to predict
outcomes would, on average, yield more accurate odds than the 2-to1 bet corresponding to the overall reversal rates.no
Three, claim construction, which-as I explained above-is
reversed at much higher rates than other issues, appears in roughly

108. In a study of patent cases appealed from trial judgment to the Federal Circuit from 19931998, Kimberly Moore found a reversal rate, including partial affirmances, of 22 percent. See
Kimberly Moore, Judges, Juries,and Patent Cases-An EmpiricalPeek Inside the Black Box, 99
MICH. L. REV. 365, 397 (2000). However, since Moore's data set was limited to tried cases, it
likely substantially underestimated the overall reversal rate, because appeals from summary
judgment are arguably reversed at much higher rates. Moreover, the implementation of Markman
and Cybor very likely led to large increases in the overall reversal rate. See Schwartz, supra note
4, at 1095.
109. See supranotes 53-55 and accompanying text.
110. To a significant degree, this assertion implicitly assumes that most cases that are
affirmed are relatively easy to predict. Based on my study of cases in FY-2008, about 40 percent
of affirmances are issued with no opinion pursuant to Rule 36. Presumably, a neutral observer
would not have difficulty predicting the outcomes of most of these cases. Another 25 percent of
the affirmances were issued as non-precedential opinions-again, presumably, many of these
outcomes would not be difficult to predict. As such, my assumption seems fairly reasonable.
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40 to 50 percent of all appeals.' As such, a huge portion of the
relatively high reversal rate appears to be driven by uncertainty in
claim construction.112 One might quip that even removing cases
involving claim construction still leaves a high effective reversal
rate-at least if one includes partially affirmed cases that are
remanded. Yet, cases on appeal are not decided as a whole, but rather
are disposed of on an issue-by-issue basis. It seems very likely that
the high residual reversal rate is merely an artifact of the greater
number of issues presented on appeal in patent cases than ordinary
private civil cases. As noted earlier, on an issue-by-issue basis, when
claim construction is excluded, the average reversal rate is 18
percent. Yet, if merely three issues are appealed, and the likelihood
of any one issue being reversed is independent of the other two being
reversed, then the chance that at least one of the three issues is
reversed is 45 percent.113 However, a 45 percent chance of reversal
does not necessarily mean that the outcome is generally
unpredictable. Not only should attorneys be able to predict the
outcome of any specific issue with much greater than 55 percent (i.e.,
100 less 45 percent) accuracy, but also-as explained earlierneutral observers should be able to achieve better than 82 percent
(i.e., 100 less 18 percent) accuracy in predicting the outcome for
each issue. Thus, removing claim construction from the calculusand properly focusing on issues, not cases-the Federal Circuit
appears to be roughly as predictable as other circuit courts,
particularly for complex cases. As such, it appears the Federal
Circuit is mostly undeserving of the sort of "coin flip" or "dice roll"
status often attributed to it. 114
111. E-mail from David L. Schwartz to Ted Sichelman (Apr. 22, 2010) (on file with author)
(reporting from Schwartz's previous study the raw number of cases in which claim construction
issues appear).
112. In this regard, because claim construction often is determinative of the outcomes for
many other issues, a reversal on a claim term may automatically lead to a reversal on other issues.
See supranote 70 and accompanying text.
113. In particular, the odds are 1 -(0.82)(0.82)(0.82) = 0.4486.
114. Importantly, the term "dice roll" as used by the IP counsel in the opening sentence of this
Article refers to "random," not to some calculable probability less than 50 percent. See supra note
1 and accompanying text. Cf Sichelman, supra note 101 (comment from Dennis Crouch)
("However, most dice games involve odds that are different than 50/50. Assuming that the dicegame can offer 20/80 odds ... [d]oes your empirical work do anything to dispel the notion that
that the CAFC decision is any better than a roll of the dice?").
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One important corollary of this result, at least assuming judges
are selected randomly for each appellate panel,"' is that the claim
that panel-dependence substantially affects outcomes-as a statistical
matter-simply cannot hold true, at least on average. Although
panel-dependence may play a role for those issues with higher
reversal rates, such as claim construction, obviousness, and lost
profits, for many (if not most) issues, it seems to play a relatively
minor role. Because many empirical studies by academics have
focused on claim construction, obviousness, and damages, perhaps
those results-which have been widely publicized-have distorted
the views of practicing attorneys.
Returning to my earlier analysis of reversal rates more generally,
even if Gruner's selection bias theory does not fully account for
seemingly high claim construction reversal rates, it does account for
some of the problem. Whatever one's view of settlement, a decent
share of cases arriving at the Federal Circuit are likely to present
difficult legal and factual issues. In other words, even if cost
constraints cause many uncertain cases to settle, those cases with the
most certain outcomes are likely to settle at much higher rates than
those with uncertain outcomes.116 Thus, the Federal Circuit hears a
skewed set of cases relative to those filed, which increases reversal
rates."' Because the Federal Circuit's overall reversal rates for patent
cases are in the same ballpark as, or less than, the rates for other
complex cases in other circuits, one can view the average reversal
rate largely as a function of parties selecting complicated and
difficult-to-resolve issues for the Federal Circuit to decide. (Of
course, my view is that claim construction is a special animal
deserving of reform, which I address in a few paragraphs.)
Last, Mullally insightfully argues that the Supreme Court is
tugging at the Federal Circuit to adopt a policy-driven, "standards"based approach to adjudication, while the district courts and the
115. See Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 444 (2009)

("Cases at the Federal Circuit are randomly assigned to judges. One can therefore postulate that
panels of Federal Circuit judges receive not only a random distribution of lower court judgments,
but also a random distribution of lower court judgments worthy of being added to the written
body of law.").
116. See Gruner, supra note 2, at 1005-06 (citing George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984)).

117. See Gruner,supra note 2, at 1006.
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Patent Office yearn for a doctrine-driven, "rules"-based approach."'
Although I do think Mullally's thesis partly explains some of the
uncertainty in patent law doctrine, focusing on the handful of
Supreme Court reversals in recent years distorts the relative stability
of decision making at the Federal Circuit. Despite the Federal
Circuit's string of defeats at the Supreme Court, it is important to
recognize that the Supreme Court reverses in roughly 75 percent of
all discretionary cases it hears.11 9 In this regard, the Court typically
grants certiorari either when there is a circuit split or when a
substantial number of justices disagree with the reasoning or
outcome of the circuit court's opinion regarding a matter of
significant import.12 0 Since there are almost no circuit splits involving
patent issues, when the Court decides to take a patent case from the
Federal Circuit, the odds are heavily stacked in favor of reversal.
Although the Supreme Court has recently heard a greater number of
patent cases, my sense is that this trend is likely to slow.
Additionally, even for the cases the Court has heard, other than KSR
International v. Teleflex, Inc.121 and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.,122 it is unlikely that the Court's opinions will have much of a
jurisprudential effect on patent prosecution, licensing, or litigation.
123
Specifically, opinions like Merck v. Integra,
Microsoft v. AT&T,124
1
2
5
Quanta v. LG, and Medlmmune v. Genentech,12 6 concern doctrines
that do not appear frequently, are not economically important, can
easily be avoided, or do not have substantial impact in practice.127
118. See Mullally, supra note 3, at 1126; see also Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two
Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (contrasting the Supreme Court's "flexible, holistic"
approach to the adjudication of patent law disputes with the Federal Circuit's "formalistic,
inquiry-truncating" approach).
119. See Stephen J. Wermiel, Supreme CourtReversals: Exploring the Seventh Circuit,32 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 641, 643-44 (2008); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 IIARv. L.
REv. 497, 505 tbl.II(D) (2004).
120. See Timothy S. Bishop & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Petitioningand Opposing Certiorariin the
U.S. Supreme Court (1999), http://Iibrary.fmdlaw.com/1999/Jan/1/241457.htnl.
121. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
122. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
123. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
124. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
125. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec. Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
126. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
127. According to the University of Houston's project on patent litigation data, only five
cases involving the experimental use exemption in Merck v. Integra and one case involving the
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Even the Court's recent opinion in Bilski v. Kappos28 is unlikely to
have a significant doctrinal impact in the long run.129 Thus, the recent
string of reversals should cast little doubt on the general consistency
of the Federal Circuit in affirming lower court opinions.
Nonetheless, Mullally's recognition that the Federal Circuit has
been pulled in the direction of bright-line rules by the district courts
and the Patent Office deserves further reflection, especially in the
context of claim construction. Specifically, in its quest for
predictability, the Federal Circuit has adopted a number of "canons"
of claim construction, which-while seemingly instantiating a formal
regime of transparent rules-are internally contradictory and rest on
flawed premises.
One important example of such internal inconsistency is the
palpable conflict between the rule that claims should be interpreted
in view of the patent specification and the rule that limitations from
the specification should not be imported into the claims when
foreign infringement issue at stake in Microsoft v. AT&T were appealed and decided by the
Federal Circuit during 2000-2007. See PATSTATS, supra note 58. As for the exhaustion issue in
Quanta and the licensing issue in Medlmmune, numerous articles have appeared advising
attorneys how to evade the rules set forth in those opinions. See, e.g., John W. Schlicher, Patent
Licensing, What to Do After Medimmune v. Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
364 (2007); John W. Schlicher, The New Patent Exhaustion Doctrine of Quanta v. LG: What It
Means for Patent Owners, Licensees, and Product Customers, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 758 (2008).

128. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
129. Although the Bilski opinion is important to the extent that the Federal Circuit is very
likely to find software-related inventions patentable subject matter, this result would merely
return the doctrine to nearly the same state as that pre-Bilski. See Shubha Ghosh, Guest Post on
Bilski: Throwing Back the Gauntlet, PATENTLY-O, June 29, 2010, http://www.patentlyo.com/

patent/2010/06/guest-post-on-bilski-throwing-back-the-gauntlet.html ("Specifically, the Court has
now revived the Gottschalk-Parker-Diehrline of cases, which were established before the
creation of the Federal Circuit and which the Federal Circuit had distilled over time into the
expansive 'useful-concrete-tangible' approach to patentable subject matter . . . ."). Although the
most "pure" of business method claims-for example, hedging and tax avoidance inventions not
tied to a computer-are now very likely verboten, in actuality, very few of these types of
applications are filed each year. For example, a quick Lexis search of patent applications filed
before the Federal Circuit's opinion in Bilski and published from January 1, 2010, to February 1,
2010, in class 705-the class under which nearly all business methods fall-shows that at least
467 of 537 (87 percent) of applications are very likely to pass the Bilski test to be implemented by
the Federal Circuit. See Lexis, U.S. Pre-Grant Publications Database (searching terms "CL (705)
and CLAIMS (software or computer or telephone or network or chip or machine or battery or
hardware or radio or server or processor)" and date range between January 1, 2010, and February
1, 2010). So, at most, it appears 1500 or so applications per year will be rejected as too "abstract"
for patenting. Thus, in the long run, the Court's opinion is not likely to have a significant effect
on the day-to-day practice of patent law relative to pre-Bilski doctrine.
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construing them. Indeed, even the Federal Circuit has recognized this
tension: "Moreover, we recognize that the distinction between using
the specification to interpret the meaning of a claim and importing
limitations from the specification into the claim can be a difficult one
to apply in practice." 30
Yet, the Federal Circuit's resolution to this dilemma, apparently
driven by its desire to promulgate predictable rules, founders as a
hollow, formal platitude. In particular, the en banc court in Phillips v.
A WH Corp.131 advised that "the line . . . can be discerned with
reasonable certainty and predictability if the court's focus remains
on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand the claim terms."132 Yet the problem with such a
formulation is that a person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA) generally cannot understand a disputed claim term
without knowing the applicable law. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Markman II, "the claims of patents have become
highly technical in many respects as the result of special doctrines
relating to the proper form and scope of claims that been developed
by the courts and the Patent Office."133
Thus, resorting to the hypothetical PHOSITA cannot resolve the
dilemma.134 In another article in this symposium issue, Lee
Petherbridge puts it more bluntly: "[W]hen it comes to claim
construction, judges are largely free to conclude what they want, by
whatever means they want." 35 In this vein, it appears that typically
unstated judicial ideologies influence judges, whether conspicuous or
not, to choose one of the competing canons in the cases in which
they conflict.13 6 But instead of conclusorily choosing a rule of
130. Phillips v. AWII Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
131. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
132. Id (emphasis added).
133. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
134. Lee Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 910
(2010).
135. Id at 939.
136. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (finding

significant differences in claim construction outcomes based on the overriding methodology of
the Federal Circuit panel); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in

Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REv. 333, 333-39 (2007) (describing several methodologies for
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decision, the Federal Circuit would arguably do well to follow the
Supreme Court's penchant for expressly stating policy choices.137 In
other words, since the differing "rules" often lead to irreconcilable
results that can only be resolved by policy choices, the Federal
Circuit would provide more guidance-and, hence, more stabilityby explicitly considering such policies in its opinions, rather than
promulgating a fagade of formalism.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS:
THE IMPORTANCE OF FURTHER INVESTIGATION

This Article has examined and rebutted, prima facie, three myths
about uniformity at the Federal Circuit. First, although the Federal
Circuit has substantially reduced nonuniformity across the circuits
and their district courts, it has not eradicated the problem, and forum
shopping remains a recurring weakness of the patent system. Second,
claim construction reversal rates not only appear high, but after
considering a variety of explanations-including selection biasactually are high, especially when compared with other patent law
issues. The Federal Circuit's adoption of competing canons of
interpretation-and its quixotic belief that a person of ordinary skill
in the art can usually unambiguously interpret a disputed claim
term-are likely the culprits. As such, the Federal Circuit could
interpreting patent claims); Jeanne C. Fromer, ClaimingIntellectualProperty,76 U. CHI. L. REV.
719, 769 (2009) ("Much will depend on how broadly or narrowly the peripheral claims have been
written and then further on the interpretive ideology deployed."). By ideologies, of course, I do
not mean political ideologies, but rather a judge's view of the role of patent system. Cf Kimberly
A. Moore, Are DistrictCourt Judges Equippedto Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH.

1, 27 (2001) (finding no significant differences in how Republicans and Democrats construe
patent claims).
137. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A

StructuralPerspective, 77 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 18 (2008) ("Perhaps even more problematic,
particularly in the face of the broad, open-ended language of the patent statutes, is the disavowal
of explicit policy analysis by the Federal Circuit."); Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection
for Patents After the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection
Certainty Conundrum, 20 SANTA CLARA COIPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 13, 62 (2003)

("Unfortunately, to date, . . . the Federal Circuit [has] attempted to resolve the issues without
explicit reference to policy analysis, relying instead primarily on case precedent and judicial
doctrine."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,

1671 (2003) (lamenting that "[t]he Federal Circuit has proven particularly resistant to considering
patent policy in making its decisions"); Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss, New York University Law
School, Remarks at the Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review Symposium: The Federal Circuit as an
Institution (Oct. 30, 2009) (arguing that the Federal Circuit would develop a more coherent body
of law by expressly addressing policy concerns in its opinions).
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probably reduce the reversal rate by designating default canons in the
event of a conflict, and by expressly discussing the policy-related
aspects of claim construction in its opinions. Last, although claim
construction reversal rates seem unduly high, based on the best
available evidence, the Federal Circuit's reversal rates in patent cases
overall are roughly the same as or lower than reversal rates for
complex cases in other circuits. Thus, it seems a mischaracterization
to term appeals at the Federal Circuit as a "roll of the dice" or a "coin
flip."
As noted, my analysis here is only a prima facie rebuttal of these
myths because more data and analysis are needed for conclusive
determinations. Specifically, data are needed on the number and
types of issues raised (as opposed to decided) on appeal, settlement
terms, the likely outcomes of cases that were settled, and the ability
of attorneys to accurately predict case outcomes over the life of a
case. Also, more in-depth studies of issue-by-issue reversal rates and
a more complete set of pre-Federal Circuit data are essential. Indeed,
such data would not only be helpful in determining the extent of
uniformity in the patent system, but also in answering the age-old
question of whether patents promote or hinder social welfare overall.

